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Educational quality is a challenged facing the South African schooling system. It is widely 
acknowledged that teachers play a central role in the quality of education received by 
students, and that the quality of teachers is largely dependent on the wage they are offered 
in the teaching profession. This paper investigates the state of teacher pay in the South 
African labour market by comparing the remuneration received by teachers with that 
received by their non-teaching counterparts. Remuneration is compared across educational 
attainment levels, years of experience and across age groups. A Lemieux Decomposition is 
used to determine what the distribution of teacher wages would look like if teachers were 
remunerated according to the same structure as non-teachers. It is found that the teaching 
profession is relatively unattractive to individuals at the top end of the skills distribution in 
the South African labour market. 
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1.INTRODUCTION: TEACHER PAY AND EDUCATIONAL QUALITY 
The central role played by teachers in determining the quality of education received by students is 
widely recognized  internationally  (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization [UNESCO], 2006). Teachers are seen as the “central actors in education, facilitators 
of learning, bringers of knowledge, brokers of relationships between pupils and the societies in 
which they live” (Voluntary Services Overseas [VSO], 2002). Within developing societies 
specifically, teachers are often perceived to be the central learning resource given the difficult 
working and living conditions prevalent in these societies. The scarcity of teaching resources 
often renders teachers the only channel through which society is able to achieve its educational 
aspirations. “Teachers interaction with learners is the axis on which educational quality turns” 
(VSO, 2002). 
 
However, the rapid expansion of access to education (particularly in developing countries) has 
resulted in the creation of incentives to lower the minimum requirements for entry in the teaching 
profession in order to meet the greater need for teachers. By lowering the minimum requirements 
to enter the teaching force, there is a danger that the overall quality of teachers (and therefore 
education) will decline (UNESCO, 2005). Teacher quality is understood to depend on numerous 
factors, which include who is attracted to the teaching force, the incentives put in place for these 
individuals to perform well, and whether the best-performing teachers remain in the teaching 
force (Hernani-Limarino, 2005). 
 
The recruitment, performance and retention of teachers is dependent on the “opportunity cost” of 
being a teacher, and the most important aspect of this opportunity cost is the wage received by 
individuals in the teaching force versus that received by individuals employed in the non-teaching 
professions (Hernani-Limarino, 2005). A pressing question in economics of education literature 
is whether the remuneration offered to teachers is sufficient to guarantee  acceptable teacher 
quality by attracting, recruiting and retaining the most “attractive” individuals, in terms of 
productive characteristics.  
 
It is therefore evident first of all, that the role played by teachers in the quality of education 
received by students is pivotal, and secondly, that the quality of teachers entering the teaching 
force is largely dependent on the wage received by teachers. 3 
 
 
The paper investigates the wage structure of teachers in the South African labour market. 
Specifically, it investigates how productive characteristics of teachers are remunerated in 
comparison with how the productive characteristics of non-teachers are remunerated.  
 
Section 2 provides an overview of teacher salaries and the teaching force in South Africa. It 
includes a brief history of teacher salaries in South Africa, an overview of employment trends 
amongst teachers and a profile of the South African teaching force. In addition, the 2008 teacher 
salary agreement is explained and a brief discussion of financial incentives for teachers in the 
South African labour market. 
 
Section 3 is a wage analysis of South African teachers. The section is comprised of a wage 
analysis conducted using an augmented Mincerian wage function and a comparison between the 
wage distribution of teachers and that of non-teachers, presenting finally the wage distribution 
that would prevail amongst teachers if they were remunerated according to the wage structure of 
non-teachers in the South African labour market. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.TEACHERS AND TEACHER SALARIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 
Edupol (1993) reports that between 1988 and 1992, average basic teacher salaries increased by 
124% in nominal terms or 30.3% in real terms. However, this increase was not uniform, with 
certain categories of teachers receiving substantially higher increases than others. For example, 
white females entering the teaching force with no official qualifications experienced salary 
increases of 49.5% in comparison with the average real increase of 10.5% for other civil servants 
over the same period (Edupol, 1993). However, evidence exists that white teacher salaries on 
average decreased by between 12% and 20% in real terms between 1983 and 1996  while real 
GNP decreased by just 6% over the same period (South African Teachers Association (SATA), 
2000; South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Quarterly Bulletins, 1990-1997). Government policy 
regarding teacher pay
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regarding salaries, with white male teachers faring worst and black female teachers experiencing 
the biggest increases (Hosking, 2000).  
 
Disparities along the lines of race and gender were also eliminated by government policy 
between 1983 and 1997. 1986 saw the equalization of salary scales between black and white 
teachers, with gender differences being eliminated in 1992 (Edupol, 1993). The overall objective 
of government policy was to bring salary scales for the entire teaching force in line with those of 
white male teachers. Average salaries were therefore not equal across race and gender groups 
(although they were still closer together) and in 1992, the mean salary for black female teachers 
was approximately half of what it was for white male teachers (who constituted 7.3% of all 
teachers in 1992); (Edupol, 1993). Given the equalization of salary scales therefore, the higher 
average salary for the latter group suggests that this group contained a greater proportion of 
teachers with more years of teaching experience and with more qualifications (Hosking, 2000). 
 
A further characteristic of teacher salaries in the 1990s was trade union pressure for the 
compression of teacher salaries (i.e. the curtailment of salary increases at the upper end of the 
scale and higher increases in the salaries at the lower end of the salary scale). Indeed, the 
Education Labour Relations Council called for salary increases of 5% for teachers in the highest 
posts, while for teachers at the lowest level of the education system were to receive increases of 
close to 29% (Bot, 1996). Similarly, SADTU proposed salary increases of around 11% or 12% 
for teachers at the lowest levels of the scale, and no increase at all for teachers at the top of the 
salary scale (Hosking, 2000). The intention of such adjustments was to discourage the acquisition 
of additional qualifications and promotions in order to increase remuneration. It is argued that 
this type of remuneration results in a “paper chase” with teachers acquiring often irrelevant 
qualifications (in terms of the education system and the school environment) in order to receive 
higher pay (Edupol, 1993). 
 
The post-apartheid equalization of teacher pay therefore resulted in a substantial increase in 
teacher salaries. In fact, black teachers who had attained four years of post-secondary education 
experienced real pay increases in the region of 25% in the mid-1990s (Gustafsson and Patel, 
2008). South Africa therefore experienced an abrupt increase in the unit cost of teachers post-
1994, creating considerable constraints for the public education system. In particular, it became 
considerably more challenging to maintain pupil-teacher ratios (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008).  5 
 
 
Salary spending per educator increased by a little more than the minimum pay notch between 
1998 and 2006, indicating first of all that the public teacher workforce is becoming older, and 
secondly that a higher proportion of educators are moving into management positions  – 
“management drift” – such as Head of Department (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008). Importantly, the 
ratio of mean teacher pay to GDP has been declining since 1997 (see  figure 1 below) –  a 
predictable trend in a country’s development trajectory and one that will render improvements 
like a lowering of the pupil teacher ratio a possibility in the long term (Gustafsson and Patel, 
2008).  
 
Figure 1: Ratio of Teacher Pay to GDP per capita  
 
Source: Gustafsson and Patel, 2008 
 
2.2
The number of teachers employed in schools and paid from public funds increased by 100 000 
between 1987 and 1997 – largely a response to increased enrolment in schools over this period. 
With the implementation of a rationalisation process in the 1990’s (which permitted some 
teachers employed in public schools to become privately employed by the same public schools in 
which they had been teaching – almost exclusively in schools that enjoyed a favourable staffing 
situation), some 25 000 teachers were privately employed in public schools (Gustaffson and 
Patel, 2008). Furthermore, a substantial redistribution of teachers occurred after 1994. The 
overall result was a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio amongst previously disadvantaged schools 
and that historically advantaged schools experienced higher pupil teacher ratios, despite the fact 
 TEACHER EMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20076 
 
that a large number of teachers were privately employed in  historically advantaged  public 
schools. 
 
Important to note is that the average annual growth rate in the number of publicly employed 
educators and in workers considering themselves educators of some kind in the 7 year period 
following 1999 was approximately 0.9% per year, while the annual population growth rate over 
the same period was approximately 1.3% per year. It is therefore clear that problems exist in 
attracting sufficient numbers of young people to the teaching profession. Furthermore, an ageing 
workforce of educators coupled with the effects of HIV/AIDS has a substantial impact on the 




In 1999, the South African teaching force was approximately 25% more feminine than the rest of 
the South African labour force (Crouch, 2001). Indeed, the September round of the 2006 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) indicated that this gap had grown to almost 30%. In terms of educational 
attainment, South African teachers are considerably more educated than the remainder of the 
labour force, as teachers had roughly 56% more education that other employed workers in 1999 
(Crouch, 2001). By 2006 this gap had narrowed to approximately 44% - primarily as the result of 
improvements in the educational attainment of the rest of the labour force and not as a result of 
deterioration in the attainment of teachers. Unionization amongst teachers is also considerably 
higher than it is amongst other professions.  Indeed, the South African Democratic Teachers 
Union (SADTU) is one of the biggest unions within the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) (Seekings, 2004).  Unionization rates amongst teachers increased until 1999, after 
which they stabilized.  
 
A PROFILE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TEACHING FORCE 
Age is a further characteristic according to which South African teachers differ from the rest of 
the labour force. The South African non-teaching labour force is decreasing in age (on average), 
while the average age of South African teachers is increasing. In terms of participation of the 
population in the teaching force, white participation in the teaching profession has increased 
substantially since the country’s transition from apartheid in 1994, while that of black workers 
has declined. Black participation in the rest of the labour force has increased, however (Crouch, 




The 2008 salary agreement for teachers in South Africa was introduced in order to create a 
stronger link between teacher performance and remuneration. The agreement was put in place 
with the intention of retaining high performing teachers  in the teaching force, and creating 
incentives for improved performance in the teaching profession. 
 
The 2008 salary agreement stipulates an immediate 5% increase in real terms and ensures 
significant future increases, particularly for teachers who are judged to perform well. While the 
previous assessment focused on the teacher’s ability to prepare for class and to conduct pupil 
assessments as behavioral input factors, the 2008 agreement incorporates an in principle 
acceptance by both unions and employers to include pupil performance in the assessment of 
teachers (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008).  A within-school assessment panel will judge teacher 
performance, and teachers judged by the aforementioned panel to perform at a “satisfactory” 
level will receive a biannual pay increase of 3%, over and above regular increases built in for 
inflation. Teachers who are judged by the district office to display a “good” or “outstanding” 
performance will respectively receive pay increases of 3% and 6% over and above the initial 3% 
gained for “satisfactory” performance, also every second year (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008).  
 
The post 2008  remuneration system therefore offers significant future benefits to individuals 
entering the teaching force since it creates opportunities to achieve salary increases for improved 
performance over the span of one’s teaching career. Indeed, the 2008 system results in South 
Africa having one of the steepest age-pay curves internationally. It may be useful to communicate 
this aspect of the teaching profession to the youth in order to attract the best candidates 
(Gustafsson and Patel, 2008). 
 
2.5 
2008 SALARY AGREEMENT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN TEACHERS 
Rewarding good performance amongst teachers either through increases in pay scales or through 
cash bonuses is not very widely used in either developed or developing countries, although 
promotion of teachers to senior teaching positions is widespread (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008). 
The 2008 system introduced in South Africa however implies limitation in the definition of 
“good” and “outstanding” performances, for example. Indeed, the budgeting and planning 
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process will require some kind of rationing to take place and this is likely to take place in the 
definitions of the various performance levels. 
 
An important aspect of this new system of financial incentives for teachers is exactly how pupil 
performance is to be included in the evaluation criteria according to which teachers are classified 
as either “satisfactory”, “good” or “outstanding”. As mentioned earlier, the 2008 system includes 
an agreement that pupil performance should play some role in determining teacher pay in the 
future. However, the fact that students from wealthier household perform better than children 
from less wealthy household (Taylor, 2008) means that the influence of socioeconomic status on 
school performance should be controlled for when linking teacher incentives to student 
performance. Indeed, even focusing on improvements in student performance may result in 
teachers effectively being rewarded for the fact that the students they teach are of a higher 
socioeconomic status since improvements in performance have been shown to be positively 
linked with socioeconomic status. An interesting example of how this is dealt with is that of the 
SNED programme in Chile, in which schools are divided into groups according to the mean 




The structure of teacher remuneration in South Africa has so far resulted in teacher at the top end 
of the salary scale experiencing the most unattractive financial prospects, relative to teachers at 
the lower end of the salary scale. It is shown later in the paper that the salary structure of teachers 
appears to provide little incentive for teachers at the top end of the scale to remain in the teaching 
profession while providing relatively attractive financial incentives for those at the lower end of 
the salary structure. The 2008 amendments to the salary structure may well prove useful in 
remedying some of this distortion and therefore providing attractive prospects for labour market 
entrants, as it includes incentive based on student performance. The fact that the South African 
teaching force is relatively well-educated compared to non-teachers indicates that more focus 
needs to  be given to teacher performance in the classroom and not merely to the level of 





3. WAGE ANALYSIS 
The objective of this paper is to investigate how attractive (financially) the teaching profession is 
to labour market participants. This section performs an analysis on the wages of teachers and of 
non-teachers in order to investigate how individuals with equal levels of educational attainment 
and experience are remunerated in the teaching profession and in other professions. It then 
becomes possible to compare the reward (in terms of remuneration) to higher levels of human 
capital amongst teachers and non-teachers.  
 
This section therefore examines the earnings of teachers in the South African labour market, 
using October Household Survey from 1995 to 1999, and Labour Force Survey data from 2000 to 
2007 (explained in section 5.2). The returns to education and experience are compared between 
teachers and non-teachers, and a Lemieux decomposition is used to investigate what the 
distribution of teacher wages would look like if teachers were remunerated in the labour market 
in the same way as non-teachers. The overall objective of this section is to investigate whether or 
not the wage structure of teachers versus that of non-teachers is conducive to convincing labour 
market participants to join the teaching force. 
 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Augmented Mincerian Wage Function 
This first part of this section makes use of the widely used augmented Minecerian wage function, 
introduced by Jacob Mincer in 1974. The classic Mincerian wage function takes the form  
 
 ln w = c + β1S + β2E + β3E
2+ e, 
 
where w is the wage (or hourly wage, depending on data availability), c is a constant, S is the 
years of schooling, E is the years of labour market experience and  e is an error term. In this wage 
function, S and E can be thought of as the “quantity” of human capital of each individual, and the 
coefficients on this human capital variables, β1 and β2 for years of schooling and years of labour 
market experience respectively, indicate the impact of an increase in each of these variables by 
one year on (the log of) hourly wages.  
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In this analysis, an augmented form of the Mincerian wage function is used in which in addition 
to the years of education and years of labour market experience, the individual’s race, province of 
residence, industry of employment, gender, union membership, status as a teacher or non-teacher 
and the number of years they have worked for their current employer are controlled for. The 
augmented Mincerian wage function will therefore take the form  
   
  ln wage  = c + β1(PRIMARY) + β2(SECONDARY)  + β3(TERTIARY) +  β4(TEACHER 
X PRIMARY) +  β5(TEACHER X SECONDARY) +  β6(EXP)  +  β7(EXP
2) +  β8(TEACHER X 
EXP) +  β 9(TEACHER X EXP
2) + β 10(UNION) +  β11(FEMALE) +  β12 (TENURE) +  β13 
(TEACHER) +  u                     (1) 
 
The province in which an individual lives, the industry in which they are employed and the race 
of the individual are controlled for in equation 1. The variables included in the model are 




 Lemieux Decomposition of Earnings Distributions 
The Lemieux decomposition is used to observe what the monthly earnings structure of teachers 
would be if they were remunerated in the same way as non-teachers in the South African labour 
market, or what a monthly earnings distribution for non-teachers would look like if they had the 
same productive endowments as teachers. 
 
The Lemiuex decomposition used in this paper may be understood to be a generalization of the 
decomposition technique first introduced by Oaxaca and Blinder in 1973 (Lemieux, 2002). The 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition decomposes the difference in the mean wage between two groups 
into the component “explained” by differences in productive characteristics and an “unexplained” 
component (i.e. a component resulting from differences in how productive characteristics are 
remunerated between the two groups in question, or “discrimination”). 
 
Decomposing the wage gap at the mean involves estimating the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
wage regression 
 
  yit = βtxit + uit                  (2) 11 
 
where yit is the log hourly wage of individual i belonging to group t (in this case to the group 
teachers), xit  is a vector of covariates, βt  is vector of parameters and uit  is an error term 
constructed to have a mean of 0 and to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the vector xit 
(Lemieux, 2002). The sample average outcome y for teachers is therefore  
 
                     (3) 
 
where   3  
and       . 
 
The outcome for individuals belonging to the second ground in the sample (in this case non-
teachers) is estimated by 
 
  yin = βtxin + uin                  (4) 
 
where yin is the log hourly wage of individual i belonging to group n (i.e. non-teachers), xin is a 
vector of covariates, βn is vector of parameters and uin is an error term constructed to have a mean 
of 0 and to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the vector xin. The sample average outcome y 
for teachers is therefore  
 
                     (5) 
 
where   4  
and       . 
 
Calculating the difference between the mean outcomes of teachers and non-teachers therefore 
yields   
 
                  (6) 
 
                                                 
3   = sample weight of individual i in group t 
4  = sample weight of individual i in group n 12 
 
where  is the difference in wages arising from differences in the remuneration 
structures faced by teachers and non-teachers (i.e. the “unexplained” component) and 
   is the difference in wages arising from differences in productive characteristics between 
teachers and non-teachers (Lemieux, 2002).   may therefore be seen as the counterfactual 
mean value of y that would result if the remuneration structure of teachers was replaced with that 
of non-teachers. In other words,  would be the wage prevalent for teachers if the “price” of 
human capital amongst teachers was equal to that experienced by non-teachers in the labour 
market. 
 
The counterfactual wage for teachers is therefore  
 
                             (7) 
 
which may be used to rewrite equation 6 as 
 
  – )   +    
 
Individual counterfactual wages are denoted  and calculated as 
 
         
 
may also be calculated by computing a sample mean of  : 
 
                                    (8) 
 
In order to estimate what the entire distribution of teacher wages would look like (as opposed to 
just the mean wage), the probit for the probability of being a teacher is estimated on the pooled 
sample of teachers and non-teachers. The probit model produces the probability of being a 
member of the teaching force conditional on individual worker characteristics, or individual x’s: 
 
  |  . 
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The reweighting function is then calculated using the estimated probability of being a teacher as 
 
   
 
where Pt is the unconditional probability of an observation being a member of the teaching force, 
or the weighted share of the pooled sample who are teachers (Lemieux, 2002). The reweighted 
distribution or the counterfactual distribution is therefore  
 
                               (9) 
 
where   (Lemieux, 2002).  
 
3.2 DATA 
This section makes use of data from the October Household Surveys (OHS) from 1995 to 1999 
and the March and September rounds of the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) from 2000 to 2007. 
After exclusions to be discussed shortly, the dataset consists of 445 825 individuals of which 
6 274 are teachers. The analysis is conducted only for employed workers in the South African 
labour market. Workers reporting real monthly earnings in  excess of R200 000, workers 
employed in the informal sector agricultural sector, domestic workers and the self-employed are 
excluded from the analysis. 
 











Table 1: Number of Teachers and Non-Teachers by Year 
Year  Teachers  Non-Teachers  Percentage of Sample that are Teachers  Total 
1995  119 335  9 379 812  1.26   
1996  178 920  8 887 387  0.88   
1997  176 228  8 917 419  1.94   
1998  143 121  9 316 540  0.46   
1999  126 319  10 213 316  1.22   
2000  263 880  23 803 968  1.10   
2001  267 568  23 123 907  1.14   
2002  264 178  22 594 335  1.16   
2003  252 052  22 439 412  1.11   
2004  271 065  22 696 340  1.18   
2005  300 334  19 294 261  1.53   
2006  320 264  20 107 937  1.57   
2007  375 673  16 430 274  2.24   
Source: OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 - 2007 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the eight race and gender subpopulations for teachers and non-teachers 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: Gender and Race Subpopulations: Teachers 
Year  Black  Coloured  Indian  White 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
1995  37 429  36 361  4 825  5 417  3 534  4 041  9 236  18 692 
1996  21 975  29 407  1 578  1 361  5 448  1 638  5 032  12 481 
1997  52 566  69 407  5 384  11 769  1 331  5 044  8 800  21 927 
1998  8 763  12 079  2 725  5 489          *  1 190  3 090  9 875 
1999  35 272  45 948  4 912  3 930  1 347  5 498  5 376  24 036 
2000  51 312  81 277  8 147  7 282  4 322  12 512  28 062  70 966 
2001  59 681  103 116  8 067  5 645  9 252  10 390  19 220  52 197 
2002  58 994  108 430  7 588  7 951  6 132  8 098  18 472  48 513 
2003  63 218  91 373  8 550  6 566  9 783  6 161  23 405  42 996 
2004  63001  115 965  9 288  6 020  3 950  8 355  14 244  50 242 
2005  72 566  135 861  7 121  4 424  817  3 853  9 995  65 428 
2006  80 186  136 588  11 923  11 153  884  5 264  24 011  50 255 
2007  77 923  162 594  9 060  21 765  2 716  3 663  10 848  85 647 
Source: OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Table 2 indicates that for the black, Indian and white populations in almost all the years for which 
data is presented, the teaching force is predominantly female. Interestingly, for the coloured 
populations (again with a few exceptions of a few years (1997, 2002 and 2007)) the teaching 





Table 3: Gender and Race Subpopulations: Non-Teachers 
Year  Black  Coloured  Indian  White 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
1995  3 744 619  2 317 728  653 396  481 198  237 806  113 208  1 098 466  733 391 
1996  3 277 458  2 160 506  692 276  526 816  211 983  118 049  1 111 256  789 043 
1997  3 473 013  2 118 792  668 739  475 127  232 757  122 705  1 096 375  729 911 
1998  3 608 884  2 285 551  666 677  493 411  225 472  115 479  1 109 020  812 046 
1999  3 882 075  2 696 221  712 148  563 361  237 791  147 008  1 111 618  856 122 
2000  8 860 954  7 489 342  1 415 470  1 219 163  508 144  277 481  2 333 885  1 693 995 
2001  8 785 386  6 851 557  1 405 375  1 179 048  518 074  300 259  2 386 051  1 696 169 
2002  8 725 865  6 387 713  1 443 474  1 144 824  513 756  306 468  2 411 994  1 656 024 
2003  8 707 858  6 205 689  1 419 159  1 212 776  523 799  303 889  2 357 477  1 706 964 
2004  8 963 468  6 260 370  1 442 778  1 226 383  550 284  276 232  2 318 257  1 653 396 
2005  7 896 627  4 780 195  1 314 133  1 060 573  477 910  281 687  1 967 549  1 507 985 
2006  8 201 773  5 246 369  1 302 393  1 095 804  482 347  308 021  1 960 123  1 510 114 
2007  7 021 599  3 596 267  1 081 366  948 369  454 056  242 035  1 654 623  1 394 714 
Source: OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Table  3  indicates that in contrast to the teaching profession, non-teaching professions are 
predominantly male with a higher number of men being employed in these professions across all 
race groups and in all years for which data is presented. 
 
3.3
Table 4: Variables Included in Augmented Mincerian wage Function
 VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 






Primary  A variable coded as a spline  reflecting the number of 
years of primary education completed. 
Secondary  A variable coded as a spline reflecting the number of 
years of secondary education completed. 
Tertiary  A variable coded as a spline  reflecting the number of 
years of tertiary education completed. 
Teacher x Primary  An interaction term between the dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and the variable 
coded as a spline  to reflect the number of years of 
primary education completed. 
Teacher x Secondary  An interaction term between the dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and the variable 
coded as a spline to reflect the number of years of 
secondary education completed. 
Teacher x Tertiary  An interaction term between the dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and the variable 
coded as a spline to reflect the number of years of tertiary 
education completed. 
                                                 
5 Dummy variables controlling for the industry in which a worker is employed and the province in which they are 
employed are included. 16 
 
Exp  A continuous variable reflecting the number of years the 
worker has been employed in the labour market 
(calculated as [age – 6 – years of educational attainment]) 
Exp
2  A quadratic term (number of years of experience 
squared) included to control for the possibility of non-
linearities in the returns to experience. 
Teacher x Exp  An interaction term between the dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and the continuous 
variable controlling for the number of years a worker has 
been in the labour market. 
Teacher x Exp
2  An interaction term between the dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the worker is a teacher and the quadratic 
term (experience)
2. 
Union  Dummy variable: 1 = union member, 0 = non-union 
member 
Female  Dummy variable: 1 = female, 0 = male 
Tenure  A continuous variable reflecting the number of years that 
a worker has worked for their current employer. 
Teacher  Dummy variable: 1 = teacher, 0 = otherwise 
Black   Dummy variable: 1 = black, 0 = otherwise 
Coloured  Dummy variable: 1 = coloured, 0 = otherwise 
Indian  Dummy variable: 1 = Indian, 0 = otherwise 
White  Dummy variable: 1 = white 0 = otherwise 
   
Source: OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 - 2007 
 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics for the variables explained in table 10. The means and 
standard deviations for each of these variables are presented for teachers and non-teachers across 
the sample. 
Table 5: Means (and standard deviations) of Variables 
VARIABLE  GROUP   
  Teachers (N = 
2 859 227) 
Non-Teachers (N = 
217 204 908) 
Total (N =       
220 064 165) 








































































































































































































Note: Own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 – 2007  
 
The summary statistics above indicate that the log hourly wages of teachers are somewhat higher 
than those of non-teachers – 3.35 in comparison to 1.93. Teachers have also acquired higher 
levels of education in primary, secondary and tertiary education than their counterparts in non-
teaching professions. The values of experience (and therefore experience squared) are slightly 
lower for teachers than for non-teacher (18.79 years and 21.96 years, respectively), and some 18 
 
76% of teacher are union members compared to just 27% of non-teachers. The teaching force is 
considerably  more female that non-teaching professions, with 64% of teachers being female 
versus just 41% of non-teaching professions. Teachers have on average also remained with the 
same employer for longer than have non-teachers, with teachers having an average tenure of 
11.68 years in comparison to 7.10 years for non-teachers. In terms of the racial composition the 
black and Indian component is almost identical for both teachers and non-teachers, with non-
teachers having a slightly higher coloured component than teachers (11% of non-teachers are 
coloured compared to 6% of teachers), and teachers having a slightly higher white component 
than teachers (24% of teachers are white versus just 16% of non-teachers).  
 
As mentioned above, teachers find themselves at the top of the education distribution. From the 
table, it may be seen that very few teachers have attained less than completed secondary 
schooling. For this reason, education is included in the augmented Mincerian wage function as a 
spline so as to enable in particular the investigation of the impact of tertiary education on log 
hourly wages. The fact that so few teachers have attained less than secondary education is likely 
to render the estimates of the impact on primary and secondary education on wages inaccurate. 
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results from Mincerian regression 
As mentioned above, the objective of this section of the paper is to investigate how teachers are 
remunerated relative to non-teachers in the labour market. Specifically, this section investigates 
how productive characteristics are rewarded amongst teachers and non-teachers, in order to 
ascertain whether or not any financial incentive exists for labour market participants with the 
highest level of educational attainment to enter the teaching profession. 
 
The output for the augmented Mincerian wage functions run for this analysis is presented in 




 Returns to Education 
In terms of remuneration for educational attainment, figure 2 to 14 below present the results 
obtained from the wage functions run for the years 1995 to 2007, discussed above.  
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Figure 2: Returns to Education: 1995     Figure 3: Returns to Education: 1996 
   
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                                     LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Figure 4: Returns to Education: 1997           Figure 5: Returns to Education: 1998 
    
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                      LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Figure 6: Returns to Education: 1999    Figure 7: Returns to Education:2000
   
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  

















































































































































Figure 8: Returns to Education: 2001     Figure 9: Returns to Education: 2002 
   
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                     LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Figure 10: Returns to Education: 2003     Figure 11: Returns to Education: 2004 
   
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                          LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Figure 12: Returns to Education: 2005      Figure 13: Returns to Education: 2006
    
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  


















































































































































Figure 14: Returns to Education: 2007 
 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 
LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
It must be noted that in the sample for which the regression is run (and indeed in the South 
African labour market), teachers generally find themselves at the top of the education 
distribution, with very few teachers having attained less than completed secondary education. 
The coefficient for these variables (i.e. the coefficients on the interactions terms for the various 
levels of education (teacher x primary, teacher x secondary and teacher x tertiary)) should be 
interpreted with caution. For example, it may be seen in the above figures that in the case of the 
returns of teacher to secondary education relative to those of non-teachers, the results are 
somewhat unstable over the period under investigation. This analysis focuses on workers at the 
higher end of the education distribution, however. 
 
The returns to tertiary education for teachers are lower than they are for non-teachers in the South 
African labour market between 1995 and 2007, indicating that on average, the financial rewards 
of additional education at the highest level of education (and therefore amongst South Africa’s 
most educated employed) is lower for teachers than it is for individuals in other professions. 
Indeed, teacher disadvantage in terms of returns to tertiary education has increased slightly over 
the years under investigation, as indicated in figure 15 below.   
 
It is therefore clear that in terms of average returns to tertiary education, very little financial 
incentive exists for the most educated members of the labour force to enter the teaching 




























are likely to receive lower returns on average in the teaching profession than in other professions 
renders the teaching profession financially “unattractive” relative to non-teaching professions.  
 
Figure 15: Returns to Tertiary Education (1995 – 2007) 
 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007 
 
3.4.2 
     
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and       Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                             LFS 2000 – 2007 
Returns to Experience 
The Mincerian wage functions generated for this section of the study indicate that the returns to 
experience for teachers are lower than they are for non-teachers. Figures 16 to 28 below provide 
experience-earnings profiles for teachers and non-teachers. 
 



























































































Figure 18: Returns to Experience: 1997        Figure 19: Returns to Experience: 1998 
            
 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and        Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                                LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
Figure 20: Returns to Experience: 1999        Figure 21: Returns to Experience: 2000 
         
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and        Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  




























































































































Figure 22: Returns to Experience: 2001        Figure 23: Returns to Experience: 2002
          
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and        Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                                LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
 
Figure 24: Returns to Experience: 2003        Figure 25: Returns to Experience: 2004 
         
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and        Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  























































































































Figure 26: Returns to Experience: 2005        Figure 27: Returns to Experience: 2006 
          
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and        Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and  
LFS 2000 – 2007                                                LFS 2000 – 2007 
 
 
Figure 28: Returns to Experience: 2007 
 
Note: Own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and LFS 2000 – 2007 




























































































The figures above indicate that in terms of returns to experience, teachers are at a considerable 
disadvantage relative to non-teachers
6
A variable in the labour force data that is very closely correlated with experience is age
. It is clear that firstly the returns to experience for teachers 
are positive and later become negative earlier than they do for non-teachers. Secondly, the 
“teacher disadvantage” increases with the number of years of experience in the labour market, 
indicating that the longer a worker remains in the teaching profession, the worse off they are 
relative to their non-teaching counterparts. It therefore becomes increasingly unattractive for 
teachers to remain in the profession as they gain more experience and the financial incentives for 
talented teachers to remain in the teaching force becomes gradually smaller the longer they 
remain there. This may prove distressingly problematic as the dismal performance of South 
African students indicates a desperate need for talented educators. The considerable disadvantage 
of teachers relative to non-teachers in terms of returns to experience is therefore an aspect of the 
teacher remuneration system that requires urgent attention. 
 
7
                                                 
6 F tests revealed that with the exception of 1996 and 2005, the coefficient on experience and experience
2 were 
jointly significant. 
7 Experience is calculated as (age – 6 – years of education completed).  
. Figure 
29 presents an age-earnings profile for the teachers and non-teachers in the South African labour 
market between 2000 and 2005. The figure indicates that beyond approximately 23 years of age, 
monthly earnings for non-teachers are higher than those of teachers, with the gap appearing to 
widen marginally as age increases. In cases where teachers have obtained a university degree (i.e. 
approximately 15 years of education), they would be between 46 and 50 years of age by the time 
they had acquired between 26 and 30 years of teaching experience, assuming they entered the 
teaching profession after the completion of their studies and remained there. The figure indicates 
that the teachers of this age would earn considerably more in other professions (between 
R1020and R2160 for the aforementioned range of teaching experience). 
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Figure 29: Age-Earnings Profile for Teachers and Non-Teachers with Postsecondary 
Education: 2000-2007 (Monthly Earnings [2000 Prices]).
 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007 
 
Up until the age of 28, the monthly earnings of teachers are greater than those of non-teachers in 
the labour market, indicating that young labour market entrants (graduates, in this case) may on 
average fare better in the teaching profession than in non-teaching professions. However, the gap 
between the monthly earnings of teachers and those of non-teachers increases in favour of non-
teachers after the age of 23, indicating that the initial benefit (in terms of monthly earnings) of 
joining the teaching force dissipates with age – an observation that has considerable implications 
for which individuals are likely first of all to join the teaching force, and secondly to remain in 
the teaching force.  
 
So far, the analysis has shown that the most highly qualified (in terms of educational attainment) 
individuals enjoy higher returns to education in non-teaching professions that in the teaching 
profession. Furthermore, workers outside the teaching profession appear to earn higher monthly 
earnings after the age of roughly 23 than do teachers. At this stage, it may therefore be said that 
in terms of the wage returns to education, very little incentive exists for workers with the highest 
levels of educational attainment to enter the teaching force, and for those who do, the early 
advantage in terms of monthly earnings of entering the teaching profession is unlikely to continue 
past the initial years in the profession. From the initial analysis, therefore the teaching profession 











































Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007. Excludes workers with less than 12 years of 
education (secondary education), self-employed workers, informal sector workers and workers earning more than 
R200 000 per month. 
 
Figure 30 indicates that teachers experience higher monthly earnings than non-teachers. 
However, the earnings of non-teachers are much more widely dispersed than those of teachers. 
From the figure we also see that if teachers were remunerated in the same way as non-teachers, 
the distribution of wages would be a much more widely dispersed, though still higher than that of 
non-teachers, given the higher educational attainment  and smaller variance in educational 
attainment of teachers relative to non-teachers.  
 
Lemieux Decomposition of Earnings Distributions 
The  Lemieux decomposition explained in section 3.1.2 is used  to compare the earnings of 
teachers to those of non-teachers at all points in the earnings distribution and not just at the mean 
as is the case with the augmented Mincerian wage function. The results are presented in figure 30 
below. 
 
Figure 30: Decomposition of Teacher and Non-Teacher Monthly Earnings Distributions 
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Section 2 of the paper explained that “wage compression” occurred amongst South African 
teachers in the 1990s, with teachers at the lower end of the salary scale receiving wage increases 
substantially larger than those of teachers at the upper end of the salary scale. This is likely to 
explain the lack of dispersion amongst teacher wages over the period 1995 to 2007 for which the 
kernel density functions have been drawn. The wider distribution that would occur if teacher 
characteristics were remunerated in the same way as those of non-teachers is therefore likely to 
reflect a wage structure that provides greater financial incentives for the most qualified workers 
to enter the teaching profession, since they are rewarded more generously for their relatively 
higher endowments. 
 
Table 6 below presents a comparison of teacher monthly earnings with those that teacher would 
have received had they been remunerated according to the same wage structure as that 
experienced by non-teacher at different points in the earnings distribution. 
 
Table 6: Actual and Simulated Teacher Monthly Earnings across the Income Distribution: 
1995 - 2007 
Quintile
8 Actual teacher earnings    Teacher earnings if remunerated as non-teachers  Teacher premium 
1  1 945  295  152% 
2  3 903  530  86% 
3  5 015  2 004  60% 
4  6 099  8 300  -36% 
5  8 289  18 562  -55% 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007. Excludes workers with less than 10 years of 




Table 6 makes it clear that the advantage of entering the teaching profession diminished for 
workers with higher levels of educational attainment. Insofar as higher educational attainment is 
rewarded with higher remuneration, resulting in the most educated members of the labour force 
forming the top end of the wage distribution, the teaching profession may well be an attractive 
occupation for workers at the lower end of the skills distribution, but may prove to be a relatively 
unattractive option for workers at the higher end of the skills distribution since. The wage 
structure of the South African teaching force is therefore not conducive to attracting the most 
highly qualified members of the South African labour market.  
 
                                                 
8 Quintiles are constructed using real monthly earnings. 30 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This wage analysis revealed that returns to tertiary education amongst teachers are lower than 
those of their non-teaching counterparts in the South African labour market. In fact, this “teacher 
disadvantage” appears to have followed an increasing trend over the last decade. Similarly, 
teachers experience lower returns to labour market experience relative to non-teachers in the 
South African labour market. Importantly, the gap between the returns to experience for teacher 
and non-teachers increases as the number of years of labour market experience increases, 
implying that the longer teachers remain in the profession, the greater the disadvantage they are 
likely to experience in terms of returns to labour market experience.  
 
The Lemieux decomposition and the monthly earnings simulated from the reweighted wage 
distribution also revealed that the teaching force is likely to be an attractive profession for 
workers at the lower end of the skills distribution and an unattractive profession for workers at 
the higher end of the skills distribution. 
 
The wage structure of teachers in the South African labour market is therefore not conducive to 
attracting workers who  may considered to be endowed with above average productive 
characteristics.  The 2008 amendments the teacher remuneration system may prove useful in 
remedying this situation to a certain extent. However, it remains an area requiring attention in the 
















Table A1: Regression Estimates for Augmented Mincerian Wage Function on Log Hourly 
Wages: 1995 – 2000  
VARIABLE  YEAR 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 












































































































































































             
N  9 229 317  8 966 307  9 093 647  9 356 751  10 339 635  24 067 848 
Adjusted R
2  0.64  0.57  0.52  0.55  0.52  0.58 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007. The province in which a worker works, the industry 
in which they are employed and the race group to which they belong are controlled for in the above regressions. The 
reference groups is nonunionised black male workers employed in the Western Cape in non-teaching professions in 
the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing industry with no education, no labour market experience. ** - 
significant at 1% level; * - significant at 5% level; ~ - significant at 10% level. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 













Table A2: Regression Estimates for Augmented Mincerian Wage Function on Log Hourly 
Wages: 2001 – 2007 
VARIABLE  YEAR 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 









































































































































































































               
N  23 391 475  22 858 513  22 691 464  22 967 405  19 594 595  20 428 201  16 805 947 
Adjusted R
2  0.62  0.64  0.63  0.62  0.53  0.55  0.53 
Note: own calculations from OHS 1995 – 1999 and 2000 – 2007. The province in which a worker works, the industry 
in which they are employed and the race group to which they belong are controlled for in the above regressions. The 
reference groups is nonunionised black male workers employed in the Western Cape in non-teaching professions in 
the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing industry with no education, no labour market experience. ** - 
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